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Abstract
Many cryptographic protocols and attacks on these protocols make use of the fact that the order
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1 Introduction
Most automatic analysis techniques for security protocols take as a simpli-
fying hypothesis that the cryptographic algorithms are perfect: One needs
the decryption key to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext, and also, a
ciphertext can be generated only with the appropriate key and message (no
collision). Under these assumptions and given a bound on the number of
protocol sessions, the insecurity problem is decidable (see e.g. [1,15,5,10]).
However, it is an open question whether this result remains valid when the in-
truder model is extended to take into account even simple algebraic properties
of low-level cryptographic primitives. This question is important since many
security ﬂaws are the consequence of these properties and many protocols are
based on these operators (see, e.g., [16,14]).
Only recently the perfect encryption assumption for protocol analysis has
been slightly relaxed. In [12], uniﬁcation algorithms are designed for handling
properties of Diﬃe-Hellman cryptographic systems. Although these results
are useful, they do not solve the more general insecurity problem. In [7,8],
decidability of security has been proved for protocols that employ exclusive
or. In [6], we have extended this result to protocols that are based on Diﬃe-
Hellman exponentiation. Diﬃe-Hellman exponentiation has also been studied
in [13] and [3]. However, in the former work no decision procedure is provided
and in the latter severe restrictions are imposed on the protocol and intruder
model.
In this paper, we show that the insecurity problem for protocols that use
commuting public-key encryption operators (such as RSA encryption with
common modulus) admits an NP decision procedure for a ﬁnite number of
sessions (see the main result in Section 4). In Section 2, we present a very
simple protocol illustrating that protocols and attacks on these protocols may
rely on the commutativity of encryption.
This problem can be related to the analysis of Diﬃe-Hellman protocols as
studied in [6] since Diﬃe-Hellman exponentiation and commuting public-key
encryption, which in case of RSA also involves exponentiation, share algebraic
properties. However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
First, the intruder capabilities diﬀer. In case of public-key encryption the
intruder is not able to compute the inverse of exponents, e.g., given a public
key (n, e) and a cipher text c = me mod n, the intruder can not compute the
private key d and then by computing cd mod n obtain m. Conversely, in the
Diﬃe-Hellman setting, exponentiation is done modulo a publicly known prime,
and thus, it is computationally feasible to compute the inverse of exponents,
e.g., given m = ga·b and b where g generates the multiplicative group induced
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by the prime p, the intruder can easily invert b modulo p−1 obtaining b−1 (in
case an inverse exists) and by computing mb
−1
obtain ga.
Second, in [6] the intruder can not obtain inverses of messages, such as b−1
directly, but only use them in exponents. However, in the public-key setting
we consider here, this would be unrealistic since inverses correspond to private
keys, and of course, we need to allow the intruder to possess such keys (own
private keys and private keys of dishonest principals).
As a result of these diﬀerences, the proofs diﬀer as well. First, while
roughly speaking in [6] we reduce the insecurity problem to solving linear
equations in integers, we now obtain linear equations in non-negative integers.
Also, we need to extend the intruder to allow private keys in her possession.
To minimize the changes necessary compared to the proof in [6], we consider
private keys as atomic messages and extend the normalization function to
make sure that in exponents public and private keys cancel each other out.
This allows us to lift the proofs presented in [6] to the setting considered here.
2 Examples of Protocols Relying on Commutative En-
cryption
Let us illustrate by two simple examples given in [17] how commutative proper-
ties of public key encryption schemes are employed in cryptographic protocols.
The ﬁrst protocol is due to Shamir. The aim of this protocol is to permit
secure communication between two agents who neither share a symmetric key
nor know the public key of the other agent. The protocol uses the commuta-
tivity property of the RSA encryption scheme:
1. A → B : {secret}pKA
2. B → A : {{secret}pKA}
p
KB
3. A → B : {secret}pKB
In this protocol, a common RSA modulus n is assumed. The public key of A is
(n,KA) and the one for B is (n,KB). The message secret is some non-negative
integer < n. The term {secret}pKA stands for secret
KA mod n. By the algebraic
properties of exponentiation, we have that {{secret}pKA}
p
KB
= {{secret}pKB}
p
KA
.
In step 3 of the protocol, A computes {{{secret}pKA}
p
KB
}p
K ′
A
= {secret}pKB
where K ′A is A’s private key. Thus, the protocol itself uses the commutativity
of encryption. Since B is not authenticated in this protocol, it is obvious that
the intruder I can impersonate B, by simply playing B’s role while using her
own public key KI .
A commutative public key encryption scheme or signature scheme may
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also be relevant in the case of group protocols. Inspired by the protocol given
in [17], Chapter 23, consider a group of l agents. A trusted server generates
two large prime numbers p and q, computes n = p · q, and l + 1 numbers
k0, . . . , kl such that:
k0 · · · kl ≡ 1 mod (p− 1) · (q − 1)
Each agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, receives the public keys Kj = k0 · . . . · kl · kj
−1 for
every j and the private key ki. Note that
{M}pk0···kl = M,
and in particular,
{{M}pki}
p
Ki
= M.
Once the key distribution is completed, a message can be signed by a subset
{Ai}i∈I,I⊆[1,..,l] of the members of the group. For example, suppose l = 4 and
A1 wants to sign a contract, say the message M , with A2 and A4. A possible
message sequence is:
1. A1 → A2 : {M}
p
k1
2. A2 → A4 : {{M}
p
k1
}pk2
3. A4 → A1 : {{{M}
p
k1
}pk2}
p
k4
On receiving the second message, A4 can verify the signatures and identity
the agents that have signed M by testing whether
{{{{M}pk1}
p
k2
}pK1}
p
K2
= {{{{M}pk1}
p
K1
}pk2}
p
K2
= M.
Agent A4 can then also sign the contract using her private key k4. The point
here is that due to the commutativity property, A4 does not need to know
in what order the agents signed the message. Certainly, this protocol, when
for instance used as a contract signing protocol, has many problems, which,
however, we do not want to discuss here.
3 The Protocol and Intruder Model
The protocol and intruder model we describe here extend standard models for
automatic analysis of security protocols in two respects. First, messages can
be built using the operator { }p, which stands for encryption by a multiset
of public/private keys described as a product of public/private keys. For in-
stance, we have that {{m}pKA}
p
KB
= {m}pKA·KB = {m}
p
KB·KA
= {{m}pKB}
p
KA
.
Y. Chevalier et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 125 (2005) 55–6658
In particular, we can model the commutativity of public key encryption. Sec-
ond, in addition to the standard Dolev-Yao intruder capabilities, the intruder
is equipped with the ability to perform this generalized encryption with any
set of public or private keys she knows (we even allow arbitrary messages).
For instance, if she happens to know A’s private key K ′A and the message
c = {m}pKA, then she can compute {c}
p
K ′
A
= {m}p
KA·K
′
A
= {m}p1 = m. In
what follows, we provide a formal deﬁnition of our model by deﬁning terms,
messages, protocols, the intruder, and attacks.
3.1 Terms and Messages
The set of terms term is deﬁned as the union of roots (also called standard
terms) and products (also called non-standard terms) in the following gram-
mar:
root ::= A | V | 〈root , root〉 | {root}sroot | {root}
p
product
product ::= rootIN | rootIN · product
where A is a ﬁnite set of constants (atomic messages), containing principal
names, nonces, keys, and the constants 1 and secret; K is a subset of A
denoting the set of public and private keys; V is a ﬁnite set of variables; and
IN is the set of non-negative integers. We assume that there is a bijection ·′ on
K which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public)
key k′. The binary symbol 〈·, ·〉 is called pairing, the binary symbol {·}s· is
called symmetric encryption, the binary symbol {·}p· is public key encryption.
Note that a symmetric key can be any standard term and that for public key
encryption the key can be any non-standard term (product). The non-negative
integers occurring in products are called product exponents.
Envision a term t as a tree structure where each internal node is labelled
by a constructor and each leaf is either a variable or a constant. A term u
is a subterm if the tree representing u is a subtree of the tree representing t
and if u is a root term. We note Sub(t) the set of subterms of a term t. By
extension if E is a set of terms we note Sub(E) the union for t ∈ E of the sets
Sub(t).
The size of a term t is denoted |t| and is the size of the representation of
t by a labelled DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph). It is linear with respect to the
cardinal of Sub(t) plus the space needed to represent the coeﬃcients in binary.
A ground term (also called message) is a term without variables. Like
a term, it can be standard or non-standard. A (ground) substitution is a
mapping from V into the set of standard (ground) terms. The application of a
substitution σ to a term t (a set of terms E) is written tσ (Eσ), and is deﬁned
as expected.
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We now formulate the algebraic properties of terms. Besides commutativ-
ity and associativity of the product operator we consider the following prop-
erties where t is a standard term, M1,M2 are products, k ∈ K, k
′ is the
corresponding inverse key to k, and z, z′ are non-negative integers:
t1 = t t · 1 = t {t}p1 = t
t0 = 1 tz · tz
′
= tz+z
′
{{t}pM1}
p
M2
= {t}pM1·M2
1z = 1 k · k′ = 1
A normal form t of a term t is obtained by exhaustively applying these
identities from left to right. Note that t is uniquely determined up to com-
mutativity and associativity of the product operator. Two terms t and t′ are
equivalent if t = t′. The notion of normal form extends in the obvious
way to sets of terms and substitutions. We illustrate the notion of a nor-
mal form by some examples: If a, b, c, d ∈ K, then i) (a2 · b1) · b′2 = a2 · b′,
ii) {{a}p
b1·c1}
p
c′·d′2
 = {a}p
b·d′2
, and iii) {{a}p
b3·c′6·b′3
}p
c6
 = a. Recall that, for
instance, b′ denotes the decryption key corresponding to b.
One easily shows:
3.2 Protocols
Protocols are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A protocol rule is of the form R ⇒ S where R and S are
standard terms.
A protocol P is a tuple ({Ri ⇒ Si | i ∈ I}, <I , E) where E is a ﬁnite nor-
malized set of standard messages with 1 ∈ E, the initial intruder knowledge,
I is a ﬁnite (index) set, <I is a partial ordering on I, and Ri ⇒ Si, for every
i ∈ I, is a protocol rule such that
(i) the (standard) terms Ri and Si are normalized,
(ii) for all x ∈ V(Si), there exists j ≤I i such that x ∈ V(Rj), and
(iii) for every subterm {t1}
p
t
z2
2
···tznn
of Ri, there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
V(tl) ⊆ ∪j<IiV(Rj) for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {r}.
Condition 1. in the above deﬁnition is not an actual restriction. One ob-
tains an equivalent protocol (in the sense that the same attacks are possible)
by normalizing the Ri and Si in the protocol rules in case they are not normal-
ized already. Roughly speaking, Condition 2. guarantees that a principal can
only output messages she has learned before. Finally, Condition 3. ensures
that every single protocol rule can be applied deterministically to an input
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message. These conditions do not seem to exclude realistic protocols. See [6]
for more detailed remarks on the above conditions. Note that in our model,
a protocol corresponds to a speciﬁcation in the Alice&Bob notation together
with an instantiation. As a result, several sessions are modelled as only one
protocol.
In our protocol model, the RSA protocol (Section 2) can formally be stated
as follows where we assume that A runs one instance of the protocol as initiator
and B runs one instance as responder. The protocol consists of three protocol
rules denoted (A, 1), (A, 2), and (B, 1) with
(A, 1) : 1 ⇒ {secret}pKA,
(A, 2) : x ⇒ {x}p
K ′
A
, and
(B, 1) : y ⇒ {y}pKB
where (A, 1) and (A, 2) denote the ﬁrst and second protocol step performed by
A, respectively, and (B, 1) denotes B’s protocol step. The partial ordering is
<= {((A, 1), (A, 2))}, i.e., it only satisﬁes (A, 1) < (A, 2), and thus, makes sure
that (A, 1) must be performed before (A, 2). The initial intruder knowledge
is {1, KI , K
′
I}, i.e., besides the constant 1, the intruder knows her public and
private key.
3.3 The Intruder Model and Attacks
Given a ﬁnite normalized set E of messages, the (inﬁnite) set forge(E) of
messages the intruder can derive from E is the smallest set satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) E ⊆ forge(E).
(ii) If 〈m,n〉 ∈ forge(E), then m ∈ forge(E) and n ∈ forge(E). Conversely,
if m,n ∈ forge(E), then 〈m,n〉 ∈ forge(E).
(iii) If {m}sn ∈ forge(E) and n ∈ forge(E), then m ∈ forge(E). Conversely, if
m,n ∈ forge(E), then {m}sn ∈ forge(E).
(iv) If m,m1, . . . , mn ∈ forge(E), and z1, . . . , zn ∈ IN then {m}
p
m
z1
1
···,mznn
 ∈
forge(E).
While the ﬁrst three conditions are standard for Dolev-Yao intruders, the last
condition, which gives the intruder the ability to perform commuting public
key encryption, is new. We call this extended intruder the RSA intruder.
Note that by performing pubic key encryption, the intruder can both encrypt
and decrypt messages. Also note that if E is a set of normalized messages,
then so is forge(E).
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We now deﬁne attacks. In an attack on a protocol P , the intruder (nonde-
terministically) chooses some execution order for P , i.e., a linearization of the
protocol rules which is compatible with the partial ordering, and then tries
to produce input messages for the protocol rules. These input messages are
derived from the intruder’s initial knowledge and the output messages pro-
duced by executing the protocol rules. The aim of the intruder is to derive
the message secret.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let P = ({Rj ⇒ Sj | j ∈ I}, <I , S0) be a protocol. Then
an attack on P consists of a linearization π : R1 ⇒ S1, . . . , Rk ⇒ Sk of the
protocol rules in P assuming k = Card(I) which is compatible with <I and a
normalized ground substitution σ of the variables occurring in P such that
(i) Riσ ∈ forge(S0, S1σ, ..., Si−1σ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(ii) secret ∈ forge(S0, S1σ, ..., Skσ).
In Deﬁnition 3.2 we restrict ourselves to k = Card(I) for simplifying no-
tations. Considering k < Card(I) would amount to detect attack even with
partial (i.e. unﬁnished) sessions. This kind of attacks can be captured too by
analyzing protocols with some ﬁnal steps removed.
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols:
Insecure := {P | there exists an attack on P}.
It can easily be checked that the RSA-protocol as formally described in Sec-
tion 3.2 is insecure according to our deﬁnition.
4 Main Theorem
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 4.1 For the RSA intruder, the problem Insecure is NP-complete.
As mentioned in the introduction, the proof follows the same lines as the
one for Diﬃe-Hellman exponentiation presented in [6]. Here we only provide
a very brief proof sketch.
NP-hardness can easily be established (see for instance [1]). The decision
procedure ﬁrst guesses an execution order of the protocol rules and a ground
substitution σ of size polynomially bounded in the size of the protocol, and
then checks whether condition 1. and 2. of Deﬁnition 3.2 are met. This check
can be done in polynomial time.
The completeness and the complexity of this procedure can be proved in
two steps. First, we prove that it is possible to check in polynomial time w.r.t.
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the sizes of P and σ whether a couple (π, σ) is an attack. Then we prove it is
suﬃcient to consider substitutions σ of polynomial size w.r.t. the size of the
protocol in order to prove whether there exists attacks on a given protocol P.
4.1 Deciding whether (π, σ) is an attack
We want to have a procedure with a time complexity polynomial w.r.t. the
sizes of P and σ. Since in Deﬁnition 3.2 we have k ≤ |P|, it is suﬃcient to
prove that:
(i) for all terms t and all substitutions σ, we have:
|tσ| ≤ |t|+ |σ|
(ii) for every set of terms E and for all term m, it can be decided in polynomial
time w.r.t. |E, t| if m is in forge(E).
The ﬁrst point is a consequence of the deﬁnition of the normalisation function.
We give now a sketch of the proof of the second point.
The deduction power of the intruder can be modelled by an inﬁnite set
of ground deduction rules l → r where l is a set of terms and r is a term.
A set L of such rules deﬁnes a transition relation between sets of terms as
follows. Let E and E ′ be two sets of terms, then we have E →L E
′ iﬀ there
exists l → r ∈ L such that l ⊆ E and E ′ = E, r. The set forge(E) can then
equivalently be deﬁned as the closure of E by the rules of L.
Let F be the set of constructors {〈 , 〉 , { }s, { }p}. The path followed
in [4] is then to associate to each constructor f in F a system of rewrite
rules Lf . The ﬁrst result is that for each constructor f ∈ F , the transition
relation between two sets E and F for the set of rewrite rules Lf can be
decided in polynomial time w.r.t. |E,E′|. We just give here the proof for the
commutative encryption operator { }p.
Proposition 4.2 Let E and E′ be two sets of terms and f = { }p. Then
E →Lf E
′ can be decided in polynomial time w.r.t. |E,E ′|.
Proof. First, we check that E ⊆ E ′ and E ′ \E = {t}. Then let r be the root
of t, and Er be the subset of E of terms of root r. For each u ∈ Er, compute
pu, the product of t divided by the product of u. If each root term v in pu is
in E, answer yes.
If no check succeeds, answer no. 
Example.
Let E = a, {a}pka·k′c, ka, k
′
a, kb and F = E ∪ {{a}
p
kb·k′c
}. We want to decide
whether there exists a one-step transition from E to F . We have E ⊆ F and
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F \ E = {{a}pkb} = {t}. The root of t is the constant a. The subset of E of
terms of root a is Ea = a, {a}
p
ka·k′c
.
• For a, we take the product equal to 1. Thus, pa = kb · k
′
c and since k
′
c /∈ E,
the check fails in this case;
• For {a}pka·k′c , we have:
p{a}p
ka·k
′
c
= (kb · k
′
c)/(ka · k
′
c) = kb · k
′
c · k
′
a · kc = kb · k
′
a
In this case, kb ∈ E and k
′
a ∈ E, and thus the check succeeds. The procedure
returns with the answer yes.
There is a transition from E to E ′ iﬀ there exists f ∈ F such that E →Lf
E ′. Thus, the one-step transition problem can be decided in polynomial time
for the set of rewrite rules L = ∪f∈FLf . We now consider the derivation
problem:
DERIVE := {(E,m) | m ∈ forge(E)}
where E is a ﬁnite set of normalized standard messages and m is a normalized
standard message (both given as DAG). It is equivalent to decide DERIVE
and to decide whether there exists n sets of terms E1, . . . , En such that E1 = E
and m ∈ En and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} we have Ei →L Ei+1. A fundamental
result is that if there exists such a sequence of transitions, then there exists one
such that En ⊆ Sub(E,m). The proof consists in considering a sequence of
transitions of minimal length E1 →L . . . →L En such that m ∈ En and to prove
that each transition adds a subterm of E or of m. Such a transition sequence
is called a normal proof in [8] or a well-formed derivation in [7]. Combining
this result with Proposition 4.2, one obtains the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3 For the RSA intruder, DERIVE can be decided in deter-
ministic polynomial time.
Proof. (sketch) The procedure consists in computing F = forge(E)∩Sub(E,m).
We start with F0 = E, and Fi+1 is computed from Fi by adding all the terms
t in Sub(E,m) such that there exists a transition between Fi and Fi, t. The
computation stops as soon as Fi+1 = Fi. The existence of well-formed deriva-
tion then implies Fi = forge(E)∩Sub(E,m). We have to decide a polynomial
number of times a one-step transition problem. Thus, the total running time
is polynomial w.r.t. |E,m|. 
4.2 Bounds on |σ|
The involved part of the proof of Theorem 4.1 is to show that when there is
an attack on a protocol P , then there exists an attack of size polynomially
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bounded in the size of the protocol. This proof is done in two steps. First,
it is shown that the number of subterms occurring in σ can polynomially be
bounded in the size of P . Note that this does not bound the size of prod-
uct exponents in σ. Therefore, in a second step, it is shown that the size
of product exponents can polynomially be bounded in the size of P . This
is done as follows: Given an attack with substitution σ, the product expo-
nents in σ are replaced by variables (taking non-negative integers) yielding
a symbolic substitution σZ . Now, we associate a linear Diophantine equa-
tion system in non-negative integers (of polynomial size in P ) with the attack
which constraints the variables in σZ (and auxiliary variables) such that when
instantiating σZ by a non-negative solution of the equation system this also
gives an attack on P . By [2], the size of the solutions can polynomially be
bounded in the size of the equation system, and thus, P . This shows that the
size of product exponents can polynomially be bounded in the size of P .
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the security problem for a class of protocols with commut-
ing public key encryptions is in NP. This result was obtained by a reduction to
the satisﬁability of linear diophantine equations on IN . The result generalizes
easily to the more common case where the set of keys yielding commuting
encryption is a subset of the set of all keys. It would be interesting to charac-
terize a class of algebraic properties that can be captured by our approach.
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